Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2021

Power Transitions in a Troubled Democracy
Peter L. Strauss
Columbia Law School, strauss@law.columbia.edu

Gillian E. Metzger
Columbia Law School, gmetzg1@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, American Politics Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
Law and Politics Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter L. Strauss & Gillian E. Metzger, Power Transitions in a Troubled Democracy, LIBER AMICORUM
D'ALBERTI, FORTHCOMING (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2762

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Power Transitions in a Troubled Democracy
Peter L. Strauss and Gillian Metzger 1
To honor Professor D’Alberti, this essay addresses the recent American experience of transition between Presidents Trump and Biden, in the context of political power transitions in the
United States more generally. Unlike the power transitions with which readers in parliamentary
democracies may be familiar, the terms of office resulting from American elections are fixed and,
as between members of Congress and the President, asynchronous. The American President serves
a fixed four-year term that can be renewed only once, so that presidential transitions are both predictable and never more than eight years apart. 2 The 435 members of the House of Representatives
serve renewable two-year terms, and the 100 members of the Senate serve renewable six-year
terms; even if a President comes into office at the same time as both chambers of Congress are
controlled by his political party (which in itself need not happen), that can change within two years,
at the next congressional election. Presidential/congressional struggles, then, are an inherent element of American politics. The nuclear age, health, safety and environmental challenges of the last
decades, and the frequency with which American elections have resulted in divided government
all underlie increasing presidential claims of constitutional authority independently to control governmental outcomes, as increasing popularism and ethnic tensions have heightened political divisions that in themselves have put the country’s fundamental political structures under considerable
stress. 3 The success of American democracy has often been dependent on members of Congress’s
willingness to act in a bipartisan manner, crossing party lines. The increasing party discipline that
has characterized recent years4 has major implications for that success.

1

Betts Professor of Law Emeritus, Columbia Law School and Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law,
respectively. We are both grateful to Samuel Weitzman ’21 for research assistance, and to colleagues for comments
at a workshop held in early March, 2021. In light of her subsequent appointment to a position with the Biden administration, Professor Metzger’s work on this essay ended with the draft presented to our colleagues. Her contributions
reflect her personal scholarship only; Professor Strauss, the sole editor of this manuscript from that point forward, is
responsible for any errors it may contain.

2

A number of Presidents (due to death or resignation) have not served out their full terms, but there is not a full
transition per se; instead, the Vice President steps in to finish out the four-year period.
3

Peter L. Strauss, How the Administrative State Got to This Challenging Place, (forthcoming, Daedalus, Summer
2021); Gillian Metzger, “1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,” 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
4

Robert D. Putnam, The Upswing: How America Came Together a Century Ago and How We Can Do It Again,
graphs cross-party collaboration in Congress, 1895-2017 in Figure 3.1:
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The Trump-Biden transition was marked by extraordinary behaviors and events that provoked
President Trump’s second impeachment. But even the transition’s mundane elements, our focus
here, may seem distressingly familiar to Professor D’Alberti and to his Italian colleagues, who
have coordinated this so well-deserved tribute. The recent national American elections removed
from power an independently wealthy, conservative national leader whose actions in office and
resistance to leaving it were deeply troubling, yet who still enjoys significant levels of committed
public support—thereby revealing deep societal chasms and distrust. He may well remain an important political influence for years to come. We imagine that remembrances of Silvio Berlusconi
have echoed in Italian minds as America’s events have unfolded. To be sure, Berlusconi’s final
departure from the Italian premiership resulted not from an election but, as can occur in parliamentary democracies, from the Italian parliament’s loss of confidence in him. Nonetheless, we
hope that an essay discussing the transition between Presidents Trump and Biden, and the resulting
difficulties for American government going forward, will interest this audience.
America’s national political transitions vary considerably from the parliamentary model. Succession can happen quickly in an advanced parliamentary democracy once an election’s results are
known. In Britain, a new government usually takes office the following day. In Canada, France,
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India and Japan, it happens within a few weeks. Should a premier resign outside the prescribed
election interval, as Berlusconi did in 2013, succession to that office may be virtually instantaneous. Although a lapse of time can result when national elections produce a new parliament, if a
coalition must be formed to identify the prime minister, the political layer atop ministries is typically thin. The permanent civil service populates high as well as low elements of government; the
layer of a new administration’s political leadership directing its activities is generally quite thin.
Thus, the bulk of important government officials continue in office through a regime change;
pending successful coalition formation, caretaker governments, understanding that important policy changes should await the new cabinet, will operate under the oversight of the new parliament
that has immediately been seated. Once the prime minister has been determined, the new cabinet
will immediately take office with her as a whole—an event that can occur with little public celebration.
Any new political leadership will depend on the training and discipline of the permanent civil
service to implement its policies, just as its predecessors did. Parliamentary transition is further
eased because new leaders may take office already well-informed about the work of their ministries. If, as is often the case, the incoming ministers have been parliamentarians with a particular
interest in the matters for which they are now responsible as ministers—perhaps even as shadow
ministers for the opposition—they may already know a good deal about and have relationships
with the civil service staffs they will be inheriting. And the continuity of staff and tradition of
service across different governments also benefits newcomers, easing the learning curve they face
upon taking office. They do not need the transition teams that new Presidents use to educate
themselves about the government they are about to lead.
By statute, America’s national elections occur on the first Tuesday in November, and the winner of a presidential election is generally known within a few days. These elections also determine
the composition of the two elements of Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Neither the President nor a new member of Congress, however, takes office immediately. Although the election may have considerably changed Congress’ political complexion, the pre-election Congress remains in office for two more months, until January third of the coming year. And
although the voters may have elected a Democrat to replace a Republican President, the Republican President and his political appointees in the executive branch—including all departmental and
important agency heads— can remain in office at least seventeen days after the new Congress
convenesr. 5 A central constitutional norm is that there is only one President at a time, reflected in
Article II’s vesting of the executive power in “a” President and the Twentieth Amendment’s provision that “[t]he terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day
of January.” 6 Only then are most of the former President’s political appointees expected to resign.
Thus, the norm of one President at a time, and the nearly two and a half months between the
election and inauguration, give the outgoing President a window in which to further policies that
the voters may just have rejected. Even outgoing Presidents who have been committed to a smooth
5

U.S. Constitution, Amendment 20. The relatively small number of important officials appointed to positions with a
fixed term may continue in office until their terms expire, see text at note 25 below.

6

U.S. Const. art II, §1, cl.1; amendment XX, §1, cl. 1.
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transfer of power have proved unwilling to forgo last-minute actions that advance their own policies and potentially tie the incoming administration’s hands. 7 President Trump’s hostility to his
successor, refusal to accept defeat, resistance to transition coordination, and commanding views
of presidential authority were reflected in a stunning collection of actions. “There is something
profoundly troubling,” Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas wrote in anticipation of the
election of 1996, “in allowing repudiated presidents to continue to exercise the prerogatives of
what is usually called ‘the most powerful political office in the world.’” 8
Power transition in the United States is further complicated by the thickness of the political
layer within governmental departments and agencies; by the absence of any practical need for
presidential candidates to commit themselves before election to the more important appointments
they will make if elected; by the way the Constitution’s explicit separation of service in Congress
and the Executive branch impacts the likelihood that new appointees will be familiar with the
operation of the body to which they are appointed;9 and by the necessity that the President’s
choices for the most important political positions in his administration be confirmed (approved for
their office after a public hearing before the relevant committee) by the Senate then sitting. All of
this can considerably slow, overall, the process of political change. Changing course has the speed
and difficulty of navigating a large, heavy vessel, not a simple motorboat.
The Trump-Biden transition, between a first-term President seeking reelection and his opponent, is only one of the frames within which transitions can occur. The sitting President may
feel confident about continuing in office and thus, at least to the point when defeat becomes the
likely or actual outcome, experience less need to attempt to secure achievements in place. Presidents approaching the end of their second term know that a transition must occur – perhaps to a
loyal supporter, to a party rival, or to the other party’s candidate. The greater the anticipated

7

See text at note 56 below.

8

Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, in Symposium, 12 Constitutional Commentary 183 (1995).

9

“No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under
the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time: and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during
his continuance in office.” U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 6, Para 2. Unlike the typical parliamentary situation, then,
Senators and Representatives (and also judges) must resign their legislative (or judicial) seats if they are appointed to
executive offices. This creates a political disincentive for the President considering such a nomination, as he usually
will then be weakening the representation of his party in Congress pending the designation of a replacement by a
process (appointment by a state’s governor, or special election) that he cannot control. History offers a warning here.
During the period 1913-2020, American Presidents had persuaded 42 incumbent elected Members of Congress to
resign and serve in cabinet positions. Nearly 30 percent of their replacements were politicians from “the other party
by the next regular election — either in midterm or presidential years.” Jacob Smith et al., “Here’s the Problem Biden
Faces If He Picks Current Lawmakers for His Cabinet.,” WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/02/heres-problem-biden-faces-if-he-picks-current-lawmakers-his-cabinet/. For President Biden, this
risk has been greatly heightened by the narrowness of his party’s control in both chambers of Congress and by the
likely impact of the most recent census, which is expected to result in redistricting of the House of Representatives
tending to favor the election of Republican House Members. He has thus far chosen no Senators; the three Members
of the House of Representatives he has chosen for important positions all represented election districts that have been
solidly Democratic for years: Cedric Richmond (Director of the White House Office of Public Engagement), Marcia
Fudge (Secretary of Housing and Urban Development), and Deb Haaland (Secretary of the Interior).
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change, the more evident will be the need to prepare. The ways in which the Trump-Biden transition has illustrated the problems of transitions are discussed in the chronologically organized
sections following. That discussion here is largely descriptive, highlighting many of the dynamics
and challenges that have marked our most recent presidential transition.
The discussion also connects to broader debates and normative concerns about the contemporary American presidency. As Michael Herz and Kate Shaw have argued, a study of transitions
reinforces the centrality of norms and conventions in constructing the presidency. 10 Although law
constrains the transition period and the actions of both the outgoing and incoming Presidents in a
variety of ways, both have substantial powers at their disposal. Often it is norms that determine
whether a transition is successful, how much the outgoing president tries to embed policy and
personnel, and how forceful the incoming President is in fighting back and pushing her agenda.
Not surprisingly, then, transitions are evolving phenomena, the contours of which change with
evolving norms and the particular Presidents involved. 11
Transitions are also testaments to the contemporary centrality of presidential administration, underscoring the strengths and weaknesses of this mode of governance. 12 In particular, transitions showcase both the range of tools by which Presidents can advance their policy agendas,
and the temporary and transitory nature of much such presidential action. In the context of immigration policy, for example, acting in an era of polarized politics and a gridlocked Congress, Presidents Obama and Trump each acted to achieve policy ends administratively where legislation
might ordinarily have been expected. While some scholars argue that expansive views of presidential power enhance democratic political accountability, the opportunities that the weeks between election and inauguration give a defeated President to embed policies that voters have just
rejected suggest the opposite. His democratically elected successor will have to staff the political
layers of responsible agencies, find the embeddings, and deploy the appropriate procedures for
reversing them – all considerably impeding, perhaps preventing, reversal of what his defeated opponent may have used the transition period to put in place. 13 In comparison to parliamentary
10

See, e.g., Michael Herz & Katherine Shaw, The President in Transition 3-13[citation form (2021)]; see also Daphna
Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2187, 2189 (2018) (emphasizing the role of norms in
constructing the presidency generally).
11

The literature is limited; notable contributions include Herz & Shaw, supra note 10; Joshua Zoffer, The Law of
Presidential Transitions, 129 Yale L.J. 2500 (2020); Beth A Davis [Noll] and Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (2019); Rivka Weill, Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers,
2011 Utah L.Rev. 1087 (2011); Nina Mendelson, Quick Off the Mark: In Favor of Empowering the President-Elect,
103 Nw.L.R.Colloquy 464 (2009); David Fontana, The Permanent and Presidential Transition Models of Political
Party Policy Leadership, 103 Nw. L. Rev. Colloquy 393 (2009) and Jack M. Beerman and William P. Marshall, The
Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C.L. Rev. 1253 (2006).
12

For our prior views on presidential administration, see, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”: The
President in Administrative Law, GW L. Rev ; The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch,” 84 Columbia Law Review 573 (1984); Gillian E. Metzger, The Presidential Duty to Supervise, 124
Yale L. J. 1856 (2015); see also Br. of Harold H. Bruff et al., Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, No. 19-7 (arguing for the
constitutionality of limits on the President’s ability to remove the CFPB Director).
13

E.g., Sarah Stillman, “The Damage: Tracking Trump’s Assault on Immigration,” The New Yorker p. 32 (Feb. 8,
2021), discussing the difficulties of uncovering and remedying the Trump administration’s hundreds of measures
implementing his preferences for the regulation of immigration and treatment of unlawful immigrants.
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systems, especially, the variety of ways in which a prior administration’s policies and personnel
have been embedded slow the rate at which direction can be changed. Does the net result of a
prior administration’s policy and personnel burrowing, together with its successor’s policy and
personnel reversals produce a government that as best as possible reflect the conflicted views of
the American voting public? Or, in our already highly polarized political environment, “[b]ecause
the President represents the median of his or her party, not of the nation, [are] the decisions of the
President normally … more extreme than what would emerge from Congress”? 14
Consideration of American transitions also underscores the increasingly important role of
courts and administrative law. To be sure, Presidents have long sought to embed their preferences
through judicial appointments, and legal constraints on executive action are not new. But as the
politicization of courts has expanded, litigation is playing a more central role in transitions; legal
challenges may expand a new President’s ability to set aside a predecessor’s last-minute actions
to embed policy, yet they may also be used to prevent policy changes. A particular question hanging over the Biden-Trump transition is the extent to which the many administrative law decisions
of the Trump era will help or hamper the Biden administration.
Finally, studying transitions raises questions about transition reform. 15 There is no shortage of proposed reforms, from shortening the transition period, to reducing the number both of
political appointees and of requirements for Senate confirmation, to making actions an outgoing
presidential administration takes during the months between election and inauguration provisional.
Many of these may have merit, but we do not take a position on any here. Our goal is instead to
highlight the complexities and evolving aspects of the present transition, thereby underscoring the
need for nuanced assessment of reform proposals as well as the ways that Presidents are always
reforming the system in practice.
I. Pre-election anticipation of a possible shift of administration
In the run-up to our November election, both the presidential incumbent, Donald Trump, and
his challenger, Joseph Biden, could act in ways that could influence its outcome. Tactics to influence the election itself, such as declaring policy preferences or promoting or impeding voter registration, are evident possibilities. This essay, however, addresses actions that could ease or make
difficult the transition from one presidency to another, beginning with President Trump before
turning to candidate, now President, Biden.
A. President Trump

14

John McGinnis, and Michael B. Rappaport, , Presidential Polarization (February 18, 2021). Northwestern Public
Law Research Paper No. 21-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788215; this question is important to
the discussions in the works cited in nn 6 and 7 above.]
15

Since both political parties can see themselves as potential beneficiaries of measures enhancing incoming administrations’ ability to effect change, and despite its recent difficulties in enacting legislation, Congress has regularly
amended the laws governing transitions to add to the incumbent administration’s obligations of cooperation and to
improve the position of candidates and of the President-elect.
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To judge by the evidence offered in his recent impeachment hearing, Donald Trump began
anticipating a possible shift of administration as early as late spring, when he began broadcasting
his view that the only way he could lose the election would be if it were rigged. Behavior by
outgoing Presidents to embed their own political preferences in ways successors would find it hard
to disrupt is hardly new in American history. The Supreme Court Justice whom many place in the
pantheon of great Justices, Chief Justice John Marshall, was among those Federalist Party stalwarts
that President John Adams placed permanently in the federal judiciary on the eve of his departure
from office. Marshall served for 34 years, well into Andrew Jackson’s second presidential term.
Putting aside the ways in which President Trump’s personal conduct of office may have transformed the American presidency, one can identify three principal means that he, like his predecessors, used to project his political preferences into the next administration and beyond: (1) the appointment of federal judges who, like Chief Justice Marshall, might serve for decades after his
term had ended; (2) embedding political sympathizers in the executive branch in positions from
which a new President would find it difficult to remove them; and (3) encouraging executive agencies to take actions that can make changing policy difficult for a successor, such as the adoption
of regulations (secondary legislation) whose recission can require elaborate procedures, impeding
the transition from one set of political preferences to another. As might surprise readers accustomed to parliamentary democracies, then, the many weeks between election and inauguration,
after defeat has become certain, can be used to heighten this effect, undemocratically projecting
the defeated candidate’s influence well into the future.
1. Appointing Judges
The United States does not have the special training, selection and advancement processes
many nations use to people their judiciary. Rather, presidential nominations to the federal judiciary
have been politicized from the beginning of the Republic, and their confirmation has now become
the priority business of the Senate when it is controlled by the President’s party. Since federal
judges serve for life once appointed, these appointments permit Presidents to project their personal
preferences long into the future. They have an incentive to fill judicial vacancies as rapidly as
possible, and the opposing party has a counterincentive to slow the process or block nominations
if it can.
Historically, there have been moderating influences somewhat mediating the politicality of the
appointments process. Like all appointments requiring the Senate’s approval, the confirmation
process entails public committee hearings with the candidate, followed by debate on the Senate
floor; this often created incentives for moderation, varying with the fact and intensity of Senate
control. Political incentives have also been moderated by consultation with the American Bar to
obtain the legal profession’s assessment of a candidate’s judicial qualities. For appointments to
positions below the level of the Supreme Court, Senate norms elevated the preferences of Senators
of the state where the nominee would be sitting. Appointment to the federal trial courts virtually
required the agreement of these home state Senators; many Senators created informal committees
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of local lawyers to assist them in making recommendations, highly conducive to merit-based appointments. 16 Until recently, moreover, Senate rules permitted a minority of Senators to use the
filibuster to block a nominee’s confirmation.
These moderating practices have badly frayed. For half a century, the distinctly conservative
turn in American politics has made the nominee’s judicial mien a major consideration—how, for
example, she believes the Constitution or statutes are most appropriately to be interpreted; or how
she could be expected to rule in cases involving a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion.
During President Obama’s administration, the Senate’s constraining practices and norms suffered
serious further erosion. In 2013, after Republican party tactics strongly resisted the President’s
nominees at every level of government, the then Democrat Senate majority eliminated use of the
filibuster for all presidential appointments (i.e., executive appointees as well as judges) save those
to the Supreme Court. Obama’s nominations, including judicial nominations, could then be confirmed. But when in 2014 the Republican party became the majority party in the Senate, it could
and did significantly impede judicial nominations, in the hope of preserving vacancies for a Republican candidate who might win the 2016 presidential election.
The most striking example occurred when the conservative Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia died on February 13, 2016, eleven months before President Obama’s second term would
end. Obama promptly nominated Merrick Garland, an experienced judge widely admired for the
skill and apoliticality of his judicial work. 17 These qualities and his age (63) strongly suggested
that the nomination was a moderate choice of a candidate unlikely to serve for many decades –
perhaps, an effort to appeal to Republican Senators understanding the importance of full membership to the Supreme Court’s work. 18 The Republican Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell,
and the responsible committee chair, however, promptly decided that this nomination would not
be considered. Despite the inconvenience this would occasion for the Court and the absence of any
precedent for such a long delay, their argument was that filling this opening should be preserved
for the President to be elected more than eight months later. This created the longest vacancy in
the Court’s history; only eight Justices heard more than a year’s worth of cases, resulting in five
decisions in which no majority could be formed. 19

16

While each federal court of appeal serves several states, judicial seats on them tend to be associated with particular
states, whose Senators would then be able to influence the choice of a successor when a seat informally associated
with their state became vacant.
17

Garland has since been confirmed as President Biden’s Attorney General, with significant Republican as well as
Democrat support for the nomination, after hearings suggesting no apolitical basis for opposition.
18

Kristen Bialik and John Gramlich, “Younger Supreme Court appointees stay on the bench longer, but there are
plenty of exceptions,” available at https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/08/younger-supreme-court-appointees-stay-on-the-bench-longer-but-there-are-plenty-of-exceptions/
19

Four cases were simply affirmed by an equally divided Court. Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of Raymore, 136 S. Ct. 1072
(2016); Friedrichs v. Cal. Tchrs. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016); Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians,
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) – the last of these affirming a judgment
invalidating the immigration authority’s policy of withholding deportation for illegal immigrants who were the parents
of American-born (and thus citizen) children, and had resided in the United States without otherwise violating the law
for many years – a policy adopted at President Obama’s strong urging. In a fifth case, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
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During his 2016 campaign, Donald Trump had announced a list of known conservatives as the
persons he would consider for the Scalia vacancy. This unusual step sent a further signal of the
deep politicization of the American judicial appointments process. When his election continued
the Republican control of Congress, President Trump quickly nominated Neal Gorsuch, one of the
names on his announced list. When Senate Democrats signaled a filibuster, in reaction to both
Gorsuch’s known conservatism and the Republican treatment of Garland’s nomination, the Republicans responded by eliminating the possibility of filibustering even Supreme Court nominations, thereby undoing another potentially moderating constraint on nominations. Forty-nine years
old when nominated, Gorsuch seems likely to serve on the Court much longer than Merrick Garland would have.
Once President Trump took office, Senator McConnell took his foot off the brake and put it on
the accelerator. In a speech to one annual meeting of the Federalist Society—a distinctively conservative organization of which he had long been a member and which substantially influenced
Trump’s judicial nominations—Senator McConnell described his goal as:
“to do everything we can for as long as we can to transform the federal judiciary, because
everything else we do is transitory. … The closest thing we will ever have an opportunity to
do to have the longest impact on the country is confirming these great men and women and
transforming the judiciary for as long into the future as we can.” 20
To this end, he disarmed the prior norms that had given “home state” Senators significant controls
over appointments to the federal bench in their state; now, Senators from states represented by two
Democrats could no longer prevent the appointment of a judge they opposed. And, in control of
the Senate’s calendar of business, he subordinated legislative business to judicial confirmations
once they had the Judiciary Committee’s endorsement after hearing.
Senator McConnell’s judicial project was perhaps never more apparent than in his treatment
of the nomination of Amy Coney Barrett (then also 49) to fill the seat that had been left vacant by
the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on September 18, 2020—six weeks, not eight months,
prior to the presidential election. President Trump had nominated Barrett for a seat on the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals three years earlier. He announced her nomination to the Court eight days
after Justice Ginsburg’s death; Senate hearings began October 12 and concluded October 22, less
than a month after her nomination. She was confirmed by the Senate four days later, the first
Justice since 1870 to be confirmed without a single vote from the Senate’s minority party, and she
heard her first argument on the Court November 2, the day before the presidential election that
President Trump would lose. An election six weeks off was no reason not to fill a Supreme Court
vacancy although four years earlier an election eight months off meant that a Supreme Court vacancy should be kept open, the only difference being the party of the President doing the nominating.
Hyatt (Hyatt I), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016), the Court was equally divided on one question, that it was able to decide when
the case later returned. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt II), 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019).
20

David Montgomery, “Conquerors of the Courts,” THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE, Jan. 2, 2019, available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/02/feature/conquerors-of-the-courts/.
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Politics, then, have a major influence on judicial appointments, and the prospect of a presidential transition deepens that influence. It would be a mistake, however, to think of these judges as
themselves simply political actors. Putting on judicial robes endows appointees with freedom from
the constraints of discharge-enforceable loyalty, and Presidents have often been disappointed by
particular decisions of judges they have appointed. To be sure, Trump’s nominees have pushed
the Court in a significantly more conservative direction, and often voted to uphold positions the
Trump administration espoused. Yet on more than one occasion Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh
(who have served long enough to permit this observation) have disagreed with each other, with
their other conservative colleagues, and with outcomes President Trump would have preferred.
Judges whom President Trump and other Republican Presidents had appointed were among those
writing opinions highly critical of some of his administration’s actions, and several of his judicial
nominees, including those he appointed to the Supreme Court, firmly rejected his legal efforts to
challenge the 2020 presidential election. 21
2 Embedding political operatives
As then-professor, now court of appeals judge, David Barron persuasively observed, 22 the
steadily growing influence of American Presidents on domestic government actions in recent decades has come about not only from the creation of a larger, central White House bureaucracy that
is generally opaque in its functioning, but also through the thickness of the political layers atop the
civil service in the agencies that Congress has made responsible for decisions. David Fontana’s
concrete demonstration of the civil service’s politicization is instructive:
The exact numbers vary based on what criteria are used to determine who constitutes a political
appointee, but some estimates suggest that the American President makes almost 8,000 political appointments, while incoming national leaders in comparable democracies like Britain and
France make just a few hundred political appointments. By any measure, this difference is
staggering. In France, there are 5 million federal public servants, and just between 100 and 200
political appointments for the new President to make. In the United States, there are 1.8 million
federal public servants, and the President makes almost 8,000 appointments. France has nearly
three times as many federal public servants as the United States, but just about 1% or 2% of
the number of presidential appointees”.23
21

See, e.g., Rosalind S. Helderman & Elise Viebeck, “‘The Last Wall’: How Dozens of Judges Across the Political
Spectrum Rejected Trump’s Efforts to Overturn the Election,” WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2020, 2:12 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judges-trump-election-lawsuits/2020/12/12/e3a57224-3a72-11eb-98c425dc9f4987e8_story.html. When in November 2018 President Trump had complained bitterly about defeats suffered
at the hands of “Obama Judges,” Chief Justice Roberts (highly conservative and himself appointed by a Republican
President, George Bush) delivered a sharp (and extremely unusual) public rebuke, saying that there were no “Obama
judges,” just federal judges upholding the rule of law. Jess Bravin, “Chief Justice Roberts Rebuts Trump’s Attacks on
Judges, and President Tweets Back,” WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2018, 11:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chiefjustice-roberts-rebuts-trumps-attacks-on-judges-1542827385. In the long run, it was subsequently noted, the judiciary
– the weakest branch --- inevitably loses such struggles. William Howell, Kenneth Shepsle, and Stephane Wolton,, Executive Absolutism: A Model (2020), available at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98221/.
22

David Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Polarization, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008).
23 David Fontana, n. 11 above, 103 NWLRevColloquy at 396-97.
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Most high-level officials are expected to and do resign at the moment of a new President’s inauguration. While some new appointments, like those to the federal bench, require Senate confirmation, a new President has no such need for the great bulk of these officials (some of whom are
professionals who may expect to serve as civil servants typically do, continuously through transitions). The new administration is free to restaff the bulk of political, policy-responsible positions
immediately. These include virtually all policy-making positions in the Executive Office of the
President. 24 The challenges of filling both these positions and those requiring Senate confirmation,
and of redressing the corrosive effect the Trump administration had throughout its four-year war
with “the deep state,” are treated in the separate section of this essay on Appointments. Here, we
discuss situations in which an incumbent President is able to limit his successor’s choice of policymakers by embedding his own choices in positions enjoying statutory tenure protection.
These protections can take either of two forms. Some appointments are made for a fixed term
of years—most often five, but as many as fourteen—and these are frequently accompanied by a
limitation on removal from them to “cause,” the nature of which may be specified to a greater or
lesser degree. Officers so protected have no incentive to resign office upon administration change.
Historically, statutes have established this limitation for the members of multi-member regulatory
bodies like the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Reserve, positions requiring political
diversity in the body as a whole and Senate confirmation of appointments. But more recently
Congress created a “for-cause” protected institution within the for-cause protected Securities and
Exchange Commission, assigning both appointment and removal to the SEC itself, not the President, with no requirement of Senate confirmation; and recent Congresses have also created a few
for-cause protected positions requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation for single
administrators , such as the head of the Social Security Administration (six years). Recent Supreme
Court opinions disapproving these innovative uses of “for cause” have cast some doubt on the
constitutionality “for cause” limitations generally. It might be possible to limit their application
to subordinate institutions embedded like Russian dolls in a for-cause agency, or to single agency
heads enjoying substantial regulatory authority and operating relatively free of such other quasipolitical constraints as the discipline of the presidential and congressional budget process. 25 Yet
the repeated forceful statements in the opinions about the constitutional necessity of presidential
“control,” not just oversight, suggest that these opinions threaten the “for cause” protections of
Senate-confirmed members of multi-member commissions designed for bipartisanship and policy
24

Senate confirmation is required for very few, including six leaders in the Office of Management and Budget, the
EOP’s principal statutory body overseeing presidential relations with domestic administrative agencies, and that has
occasionally constrained presidential choices. Director of OMB, see 31 U.S.C. § 502(a); Deputy Director of OMB,
see 31 U.S.C. § 502(b); Deputy Director for Management, see 31 U.S.C. § 502(c); Controller of the Office of Federal
Financial Management, see 31 U.S.C. § 504(b); Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
see 44 U.S.C. § 3503(b); and Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, see 41 U.S.C. § 1102(b).
25

Selia Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Board, 140 S.Ct. 2183 (2020) invalidated a “for cause” limitation
Congress had created for an agency headed by a single administrator, as Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), had done in the case of a multi-member board operating under the
SEC’s limited control.. See Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization: PCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers,
Humphreys Executor, Morrison and Freytag, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 940 (2011). The Court found both statutory limitations to be unconstitutional limitations of presidential oversight authority.
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endurance across administrations. If they do, the impact of presidential transitions would be more
profound. 26
More important constraints exist for policy-responsible positions within the civil service that
enjoy protections against removal enforceable by the Merit Systems Protection Board, an independent body of three members serving staggered six-year terms from which they too can be removed only “for cause”.27 Until 1978, the ranks of the Civil Service, GS-1 through GS-15, included at their upper end (GS 13-15) numerous individuals with important policy-making and/or
policy-implementing responsibilities. At the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where author
Strauss was General Counsel 1975-77, these included the heads of each of the Commission’s several bureaus, themselves responsible for developing published guidance about the Commission’s
regulations, deciding whether safety issues identified by their staff warranted Commission attention, and many other important functions. As civil service employees, their appointments reflected
meritocratic judgments not wholly in the Commission’s control, and they could not be freely removed from office or transferred to other responsibilities. With the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 28 all positions like these were transferred into a Senior Executive Service (SES) subject to
considerably greater control by an agency’s responsible political officials. The stated purpose of
this change was to promote greater efficiency by making it easier to reward excellent performance,
and discipline poor performance, than civil service controls over GS tenure had to that point permitted. Nonetheless, the SES system was rather quickly turned to political uses. Although the
statute limits “political” appointments to 10% of an agency’s SES positions, Presidents and their
political appointees soon learned to use their disciplinary and transfer-of-responsibility authority
over SES employees to “encourage” disfavored apolitical incumbents to resign. 29 Further, by then
transferring the incumbents in their “political” SES positions into now-vacant positions defined as
26

Compare, e.g., Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 1205, 1210
(2014) with Peter Strauss, “The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,” 84
Colum. L. Rev. 573 1984; see also Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies, 98 Corn. L. Rev. 769, 786 (2013) (cataloguing removal protections across 81 federal agencies).
27

Disputes brought to the MSPB are initially heard and decided by individual administrative judges, subject to its
review; the possibility that these administrative judges will themselves be found to have been unlawfully appointed
under recent Supreme Court precedent, Lucia v. SEC, S.Ct. 2044 (2018), has further reduced the effective protection
employees can obtain. Eric Katz, “New Trump Administration Strategy Leaves Fired Feds Seeking Recourse in Indefinite Purgatory,” available at https://www.govexec.com/work-force/2020/09/new-trump-administration-strategyleaves-fired-feds-seeking-recourse-indefinite-purgatory/168201/.
The MSPB lacked a quorum for the entirety of the Trump administration, and currently has a backlog of over 3,000
cases. See text at note 118 below.
28

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.

29

The Secretary of Interior, for example, effectively removed important SES bureaucrats by reassigning them to positions for which they were not fit. Juliet Eilperin & Lisa Rein,” Zinke Moving Dozens of Senior Interior Department
Officials in Shake-Up,” WASH. POST (June 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/zinke-moving-dozens-of-senior-interior-officials-in-shake-up/2017/06/16/11801d3a-5295-11e7-b064-828ba60fbb98_story.html. When
he moved headquarters for the Bureau of Land Management from Washington, D.C., to a western city closer to the
public lands it administers, but with just over 1% the population of the capital’s metropolitan area, seven-eighths of
them resigned. Juliet Eilperin, “Trump Officials Moved Most Bureau of Land Management Positions Out of D.C.
More Than 87 Percent Quit Instead,” WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01/28/trump-blm-reorganization/.
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apolitical, they could embed employees sharing their policy preferences into career positions from
which a subsequent administration might find it hard to disengage them. This has been an important element of the agency politicization process Professor Barron wrote about. 30
3 “Midnight Regulations”
In parliamentary systems, a new government comes into power with parliamentary control,
and with ministers immediately in command of their ministries. If desired, it can produce virtually
instantaneous reversal of the prior administration’s accomplishments, whether they were the product of primary or secondary legislation. But here, too, the presidential system permits significant
embedding. An American President may be able to institute policies or programs in ways a successor would find difficult to dislodge. One way of viewing this possibility is that it (like the
effects of the transition period generally) moderates the extent to which regime change effectuates
major shifts in social direction. As previously remarked, changing course has the speed and difficulty of navigating a large, heavy vessel, not a simple motorboat.
The survival of the health insurance plan President Obama persuaded the Congress to enact
soon after his presidency began, known as the Affordable Care Act, is a good example. The Republican party and conservatives had strongly opposed its enactment, and made clear their purpose
to eliminate the program as soon as they had the power to accomplish that. Yet although President
Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign promised to replace the ACA with a better national medical
insurance regime, and his election also brought the Republican Party control of both Houses of
Congress, he was unable to achieve its repeal. Litigation seeking that end has to date failed; one
challenge that the Trump administration supported still pending at our Supreme Court, but the
Biden administration has informed the Court that the United States now supports the ACA.
The great bulk of America’s federal law embodied in binding texts is secondary, not primary,
legislation that Congress has authorized agencies to adopt, generally after following public procedures set by the federal Administrative Procedures Act. The APA requires, inter alia a reasoned
explanation for this rulemaking, that typically occupies many more pages of the Federal Register
when it is published than the text of the rule itself.31 An agency must follow these procedures,
subject to what can be rather demanding judicial review, whether it is adopting, amending, or
repealing a regulation. After a transition to new leadership, that agency must follow the same
procedures to remove any now objectionable regulations the outgoing administration had adopted,
explaining its reasons for the change of course. This process can be time-consuming and expensive
within the agency, and is itself subject to judicial review. Judicial review defeated four out of five
challenged rulemaking or other policymaking actions Trump administration agencies had undertaken, many of which addressed regulations that Obama administration agencies had adopted.32
A phenomenon called “midnight regulations,” is an arguable consequence of regulations’
stickiness. During the last months of their authority, outgoing administrations observably seek to
30

Note 22 above.

31

5 U.S.C. 553.

32

NYU Institute for Policy Integrity, Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, (152/189 rules failed to
survive a judicial challenge) available at https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
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adopt a substantial body of secondary legislation embodying their preferences. 33 Many lateadopted regulations, of course, may be routine and relatively uncontroversial— anticipating the
end of an administration can provoke a concerted effort to finish actions delayed for any reason.
Others, however, are more significant, and can reflect an effort to put in place important policies
a successor administration would be likely to reject. For several decades now the most important
new regulations have been subject to White House oversight, and the executive order establishing
this process34 defines two categories of proposed regulation for the most exacting oversight, “major” and within that category “economically significant” rules.t. An analysis done by the George
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center shows almost a doubling in “major” rules in the
last year of the Clinton administration (52 in 199997 in 2000) and large increases also in the
final years of the GW Bush (64 in 2007 105 in 2008) and Obama (81 in 2015 127 in 2016)
administrations. The rate at which President Trump’s agencies adopted major rules in relation to
the preceding year increased further still, in both number and disproportion (87 in 2019 167 in
2020). 35
In just the last five months it was in office (that is, concluding January 20, 2021) the Trump
administration published 1490 new regulations, 36 While the majority were doubtless routine, 37
over 220 were “major” in the executive order’s terms and 130 of these were adopted after President
Trump had lost the election – 27 in November, 47 in December and 56 more in its final three weeks
in office. Twenty-five of these pre-election major rules and 49 post-election were designated
“economically significant” rules – that is, these 74 rules had the importance for which the executive order requires the most intense White House engagement. And more than a few of these important, late-in-the-presidential-term actions represented efforts to embed policies the Biden administration would find objectionable. For example, on January 6, 2021 (the day of the Capitol
riots) the Environmental Protection Administration published and made immediately effective a
regulation assigning less weight to scientific studies of the harms that might result from personal
exposure to dangerous substances if raw data they were built on, including medical histories and
other confidential data from human subjects, had not been revealed.38 Keeping that data confidential had been a standard practice, to encourage public participation and protect patient privacy. The
33

Jack M. Beerman, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN L. 285 (2013) reports a study
of the phenomenon done for the Administrative Conference of the United States, available at https://www.acus.gov/report/midnight-rules-final-report.
34

Executive Order 12866, in place with various amendments since the Clinton administration, requires some proposed
regulations, those that along some dimensions are “major,” to follow an analytic process more demanding than the
APA and subject to intensive oversight by the Office of Information and Regulatory (OIRA), an important element of
the OMB, note 24 above.
35

https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/midnight-regulations.

36

The numbers in this paragraph were all taken from the Center’s Google Sheet downloadable at
https://gwu.app.box.com/v/2020-2021-FR-rules-CRA-window.
37

E.g., a January 15 rule of the Federal Aviation Administration concerning special flight authorizations for supersonic
aircraft, 86 Fed. Reg. 3782, row 1453 in the Google Sheet of note 36.
38

“Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions and Influential Scientific Information,” 86 Fed. Reg. 469-01 (Jan. 6, 2021). The Environmental Defense Fund, an NGO often litigating
such issues, promptly challenged the “immediate effectiveness” of the rule, an element that if operative would have
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new rule would substantially complicate evaluation of risks that EPA was responsible to regulate,
thus restricting their regulation.
And the outgoing administration can embed its policy preferences in many other ways, some
quite hard to detect. We treat embedment more fully in the fourth section of this essay, “Undoing/changing the prior administration’s acts.” For the moment, the point to observe is that the
Trump administration has proved successful in embedding many of its policy preferences in an
administration that would prefer to take a different direction, and that much of this activity occurred after the election results were known.
B. Candidate Biden
Opposition candidates often speak before the election about the political courses they mean to
take, identifying policies of the incumbent they find objectionable in ways they hope voters will
share and promising their reversal; they will be developing lists of persons for the myriad political
positions that election success would require them to fill. They are in not yet in any position, of
course, to embed their views or actors favorable to them. Nor do they typically make public the
identity of those they would expect to nominate to high position, judicial or executive, if elected.
Candidate Trump’s publication of the list of names he would consider for Supreme Court appointment was in this respect highly unusual, an indicator of the extent to which such nominations have
become politicized. So, too, was George W. Bush’s announcement that, if elected, he would nominate the much respected African-American General Colin Powell to be Secretary of State. Candidate Biden made no such announcements. For candidate Biden, his choice of Kamala Harris as
his running mate, a progressive woman whose parents were of African and South Asian dissent,
made clear that one should expect liberal-left politics and a great deal of ethnic and gender diversity among his choices for office; 39 but he put forward no names.
In parliamentary democracies, not only is the number of political appointments having to be
made orders of magnitude smaller,40 but voters will often have a good idea who will be in the most
important cabinet positions of the next Prime Minister. The politics of party control signal the
future of government leadership in ways the American nomination process cannot match. If there
has been a shadow government, its members are known – and have been educated over time about
imposed on President Biden’s EPA the significant costs of repealing it; the EDF also raised significant doubts about
the validity of the rule generally. This challenge to the regulation’s immediate effectiveness succeeded barely a week
after President Biden’s inauguration, Env’t Def. Fund v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 4:21-cv-03-BMM, 2021 WL
270246, at *8–11 (D. Mont. Jan. 27, 2021). Citing the doubts that had been raised about its validity, the new administration’s EPA promptly moved the court to vacate the underlying rule, effectively ending its legal force; the plaintiffs
did not oppose the motion, and the court quickly granted it. Env’t Def. Fund v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 4:21-cv00003-BMM, 2021 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 24202, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 1, 2021).
39

In their campaign debut together, he remarked:
"This morning, all across this nation, little girls woke up, especially little Black and brown girls who so often may
feel overlooked and undervalued in our society – but today, maybe they’re seeing themselves for the first time in
a new way."

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-introducing-kamala-harris-his-vicepresidential-running, visited May 6, 2021.
40

Note 23 above.
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the important issues before the ministries for which they might become responsible. A lengthy
advance period is hardly required. Where a presidential candidate faces a sprint to fill thousands
of positions with new faces if successful, the parliamentary process might be better characterized
as a marathon participated in by relatively few, over extended periods. 41 Of course, there can be
circumstances in which parliaments become, in effect, caretaker governments – for example, in
the interval between a loss of confidence in the present administration and the following election,
or should there be difficulties creating a coalition post-election known, with parliamentarians chosen but the government not yet formed. Yet in both cases parliament is sitting and responsible
throughout; in any pre-election period, caretaker status carries with it an understanding that little
should be done to tie the hands of the next government – whatever it will be – with the motivation
of the impending campaign to enforce that; should forming a post-election coalition prove difficult,
that very uncertainty will restrain the sitting parliament from controversial legislation, and the
senior civil servants then acting for the ministries will if at all possible be responsibly awaiting the
resolutions of any political leadership uncertainties before acting on controversies arising in the
interregnum. 42
Candidates do know, of course, that if elected they will have immediately to make concrete
plans for their administration, both its policy objectives and the myriad personnel needed to administer it. As an amendment to existing legislation structuring the transition period itself,43 the
Pre-Election Transition Act of 2010 required the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) to
start providing all principal presidential candidates limited support for their possible transition,
once officially selected by their party’s convention in late summer. 44 The Act also obligated the
current administration to supply information and support early on, and a 2015 measure went further, requiring the current administration to create a White House Transitions Council and a separate Agency Directors Council.45 This support, of course, is to be used only for activities connected
to assuming office and cannot be connected to campaign activities. 46 It permits getting a transition
team ready for the hard work it will have to do should the candidate’s campaign succeed, together
with possible national security briefings and limited other support.
Presidential candidate Biden found little support from these measures, that ultimately depend
on unenforceable norms of presidential cooperation with one’s rival for which President Trump,
like other norms of the presidency, had little patience. Rather, beginning well before the election
itself and perhaps anticipating his defeat in the wake of what was, in general, his administration’s

41

This theme is well developed in Fontana, note 11 above.

42

Rivka Weill, Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1087 (2011).

43

See text at note 49 below.

44

Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 §2(a), Pub. L. No. 111-283, 124 Stat. 3045, codified at 3 U.S.C.
§ 102 note (2018); see also Martha Joynt Kumar, Before the Oath: How George W. Bush and Barack Obama Managed
a Transfer of Power 37-56 (2015) (describing changes enacted over the years).
45

John P. Burke, The Contemporary Presidency, “It Went Off the Rails”: Trump’s Presidential Transition and the
National Security System, 48 Pres. Stud. Q. 832, 833-34 (2018).
46

Pre-Election Transition Act § 2(a) (amending the Presidential transition Act to add new §§ 3(h)(2)(A)-(C)).
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disastrous handling of the Covid19 pandemic, 47 he acted to plant the seed of “election fraud” and
in many ways to embed both the personnel and the policies that might carry his preferences forward into the next administration, and frustrate its success.
II. The transition period
The formal transition period starts after the election, once the winner of the election is known
– generally by the following morning, although the elections of 2000 and 2020 took longer. For
up to two-and-a-half months, the United States has both an outgoing and an incoming President—
often of different parties, and sometimes recent electoral rivals. The transition period is a critical
time for the peaceful and successful transfer of power, but many factors can create substantial
bumps in the road to that goal. Its shape depends significantly on other factors, such as whether
the incumbent President is a one or two term President and whether the transition represents a
change in partisan control, as well as the attitude of the outgoing and incoming Presidents. Given
the Twenty-Second Amendment’s limitation of a President to two terms, Presidents in their second
terms know that a transition is coming and have more incentive to plan for it. A one-term President,
by contrast, is likely to have given little attention to transition planning—and may not be disposed
to be particularly helpful to a rival. Similarly, a transition to a new President of the same party is
likely to be smoother and have more continuity (especially if the incoming President is the current
Vice-President) than when the incoming President is of the opposing party.48
1. Statutes, Norms, and Recent Transition Experience. The constitutional and statutory framework governing the transition period is of relatively recent vintage. The Twentieth Amendment,
which moved the start date for the new presidential term to January 20th from early March, was
adopted in January 1933; only in 1963 was the first Presidential Transition Act enacted, 49 animated
by a desire to “promote the orderly transfer of the executive power” and reduce the incoming
administration’s dependence on private money to support transition planning. It authorizes the
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) to provide office space, services, and funding to “the
apparent successful candidates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections.” Subsequent amendments have
added disclosure requirements, contribution limits on private support, and early security clearance
processing for transition-team members and for those who will be nominated for positions in the
new administration.50 The most recent amendments require the incumbent President to create
councils to help coordinate transition and negotiate a memorandum of understanding with each

47

The major exception was its successful commitment to the speedy development of effective vaccines – but their
effectiveness and availability was established only after the election (by which time the country had experienced what
were then the world’s highest infection and death rates from the disease) and after significant periods of resistance to
public warnings and measures that might have limited Covid’s impact.
48

Kumar, supra note 44, at 12-18, 36-37.

49

Presidential Transitions Act of 1963 §3, codified at 3 U.S.C. § 102 note (2018); Joshua P. Zoffer, Note, The Law
of Presidential Transitions, 129 Yale L. J. 2500, 2523-24 (2020).
50

Zoffer, supra note 49, at 2524.
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candidate’s transition team contain an ethics plan and governing its access to government employees, facilities and documents. 51
The quality of a transition, within this statutory framework, is a function of cooperation between the incumbent administration and its successors, as well as, individually, on “what the winning presidential candidate does to prepare for office and what the incumbent [P]resident chooses
to do as he leaves office.”52 The three most recent presidential transitions illustrate the possibilities. The transition from George W. Bush, a two-term President, to Barack Obama, exemplified
facilitating the transfer of authority in a continuing presidency. 53 The Bush administration started
planning for transition at the end of 2007, encouraged pre-election preparation, expedited security
clearances for transition and incoming personnel, gathered information for the incoming administration, and provided frequent access to government personnel and documents. Candidate
Obama also engaged with transition early, assigning trusted staff to start planning for it in late
spring and summer of 2008, once his candidacy seemed likely. 54
Despite his welcome commitment to assuring a smooth transfer of power, the nearly two and
a half months between the election and inauguration gave President Bush a window in which both
to advance his policy preferences and potentially to tie the incoming Obama administration’s
hands. The 2008 transition coincided with a major financial crisis, and public attention naturally
gravitated to Obama’s views on economic recovery measures. While preserving space for him to
devise responses to the crisis, President Bush nonetheless made his own policy moves, ones that
Obama opposed. 55 His administration issued a large number of controversial and economicallysignificant “midnight rules” during the transition period, 56 expanded gas and oil leases on national
lands and signed a treaty that Obama opposed—just as President Clinton, Bush’s predecessor, had
signed the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court despite Bush’s objections. 57
By contrast, the Obama-Trump transition in 2016 was far more problematic. Like President
Bush, President Obama was a two-term President facing the certainty of transition to someone,
51

Zoffer, supra note 49, at 2517, 2525-26.

52

Id. at 8.
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Kumar, supra note 44, at 5; Jim Puzzanghera, A tale of two transitions amid crisis: Bush smoothed the path for
Obama, while Trump creates chaos for Biden, Boston Globe, Dec. 22, 2020.
54

Kumar, supra note 44, at 5-6, 44-51, 60-61, 249-51.
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Puzzanghera, supra note 13; Rivka Weil, Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lame Ducks and Caretakers, 2011
Utah L. Rev. 1087, 1087-1088 (2011).
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See supra Part I.3; Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemakings and Political Transitions, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev.
471, 472-73, 504 (2011). Curtis W. Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., R4077, “Midnight Rules” Issued Near the End
of the Bush administration: A Status Report 1 (2009)(“Dozens of controversial rules” were issued in the final months
of Bush administration). Although many of Bush’s rules were controversial, it does appears that “President Bush’s
administration decreased the rate of economically significant rulemaking following the 2008 election.” GAO, GAO,
GAO-18-183, Federal Rulemaking: OMB Should Work with Agencies to Improve Congressional Review Act Compliance during and at the End of Presidents’ Terms (Mar. 2018) at 10.
57

Weil, supra note 30, at 1087-88; Felicity Barringer, U.S. to Open Public Land Near Parks for Drilling, N.Y.Times,
Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/08/us/08lease.html.
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and his administration started preparing for transition in April 2016. Following the example that
President Bush had set for an interparty handoff, President Obama interacted with Trump several
times, meeting with him in the Oval Office shortly after the election. 58 He sought to pair his administration’s officials with Trump representatives, and scheduled “two war-gaming exercises to
prepare Mr. Trump and his staff for a potential national security crisis,” just as Bush had done for
Obama. 59 Trump’s behavior, however, both as candidate and as President-elect, was quite unlik
Obama’s. He made last-minute changes in his transition’s leadership, casting aside much of the
preparatory work his initial transition team (headed by former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie) had done. 60 Deep distrust emerged between the Obama and Trump camps, with top Obama
law enforcement officials concluding that Trump campaign personnel and nominees posed sufficient national security risks to require investigation.61 And, like his predecessors, President Obama
continued to advance his own regulatory and foreign policy preferences throughout the transition
period, using advancing policies with which the newly elected, but not yet inaugurated President
Trump strongly disagreed.62
Unlike Bush-Obama and Obama-Trump, the Trump-Biden transition occurred in the wake of
a single-term presidency, when any incumbent might be relatively inattentive to transition planning before the election, and President Trump’s confidence in a favorable outcome for himself,
both before and after its occurrence, doubtless contributed to his indifference to it. As has already
been noted, both during his campaign and after the election he made extensive use of his opportunities to embed judges, executive branch employees and policy commitments likely to impede
President Biden’s success. Beyond these embedding efforts, though, his personal refusal to concede the election, numerous lawsuits, and repeated false allegations of electoral fraud provoked an
unruly mob’s attempt, two weeks before inauguration, to block the ultimate determination of its
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outcome,63 After thus poisoning the transition atmosphere, President Trump left the White House
for his Florida mansion on the morning of inauguration, denying even the semblance of commitment to presidential continuity. And at the institutional level, things were little better. Although
major networks called the election for Biden on November 7, four days after Election Day, there
was a two-week delay before the GSA Administrator “ascertained” that Biden was the election
winner, 64 giving him access to over $6 million in government funding and other services, and his
transition team access to agency employees and documents. 65 Once agency meetings did begin,
President Trump’s political appointees insisted on attending Biden transition teams’ meetings with
career agency staff – indeed, in some cases, agencies simply resisted such meetings; in others, they
curtailed national security access the new administration would need to understand matters that
would require their immediate attention.66 Responsible career officials nonetheless were generally
able to provide the Biden transition staff the access to information and agency personnel it
needed.67
The Trump-Biden transition, then, demonstrates the limits of legal regulation and the critical
role played by norms and the longstanding American commitment to peaceful transfer of power.68
Despite the frequent congressional expansions of the governing legal framework to mandate
greater and earlier support, an uncooperative outgoing President and administration can stymie a
smooth transition. To be sure, new amendments might respond to some elements of the TrumpBiden experience: changing the threshold for the GSA’s ascertainment determination, for example,
to being that a candidate is “substantially likely” to be the election victor; or increasing the role of
senior career officials in transition.69 Yet the process is fundamentally beholden to the incoming
and outgoing Presidents’ commitments to ensuring a successful transfer of power.
2. Actions During the Trump-Biden Transition. Incoming Presidents have many pressing tasks
on their plates during transition. Perhaps the most imperative is identifying political appointees
for the new government – selecting cabinet and other high officials who will require Senate confirmation before they can take office and also White House staff and intermediate level appointees
63
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who don’t require Senate confirmation, important personnel who can assume office immediately. 70
At the same time, the transition needs to field a raft of agency review teams that meet with agency
staff, examine agency documents, and identify issues for the incoming administration to address.
The transition also must focus on developing the President-elect’s policy agenda, crafting 100 day
and 200 day plans, preparing executive actions to be announced in the administration’s first days
in office, putting together a budget, and responding to events. 71
Although President Biden continued with transition activities throughout President Trump’s
determined efforts to overturn the presidential election results, naming his full cabinet by January
15, 2021 72 and preparing a substantial number of executive actions for his first weeks in office,
Trump’s attack on the election results had ongoing impact, contributing to Senate delays in confirming Biden’s nominees. 73 As a result, despite having announced significantly more nominees
by Inauguration Day than Presidents Bush, Obama, or Trump, President Biden started his administration with the fewest confirmed cabinet members. Only one member of Biden’s Cabinet was
confirmed on his first day in office with the next two cabinet members not confirmed until several
days later, whereas other Presidents have had at least a couple in place from the start. 74 And
Trump’s resistance meant that Biden did not start to receive the President’s Daily Brief until after
the GSA’s ascertainment; and after this, he alleged, Trump administration obstruction of transition
access to national security information continued. 75
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The Trump administration added some new twists while also undertaking the more familiar
last-minute transition actions. It issued more important regulations than had any other recent administration—rules that the Biden administration will find costly to dislodge, 76 adding the new
twist of making many immediately effective, presumably to prevent Biden administration acting
as predecessors had often done immediately on inauguration, putting on hold rules that had not yet
become effective before they assumed office. 77 To foster the deregulation that had been President
Trump’s mantra, it took many other deregulatory administrative actions likely to be at odds with
the incoming administration’s view. In just one week, for example, the administration enacted a
remarkable number of environmental rollbacks, including rules and single-shot adjudicatory decisions:
[T]he Interior Department overturned an Obama-era measure that increased royalties that oil, gas and coal companies pay the federal government; cut 3.4 million
acres in critical habitat for the northern spotted owl, which faces extinction; expedited approvals to lease more than 550,000 acres of the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge for energy development; and approved a four-lane highway through Utah’s
Red Cliffs National Conservation Area, which had been permanently protected as
a wildlife reserve 25 years ago.78
In the month and a half after losing the election, President Trump made around three dozen appointments to federal boards and commissions, 79 his administration embedded a large number of
political appointees in career positions protected by civil service rules. 80 It sought to use contracts
with states and localities to lock in controversial policies, an unusual move – for example, when
the Department of Homeland Security used them to commit itself to provide 180 days written
notice before reducing or relaxing immigration enforcement.81 Similarly, in an effort to prevent
the repeal of its controversial actions permitting the imposition of work requirements as a condition
of receiving Medicaid benefits, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) signed
76
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agreements with several jurisdictions requiring it to provide nine months’ notice before their termination. 82 Although the Biden administration has treated these contractual restraints as ineffective, the contracts provide a basis on which jurisdictions can—and have—sued for their enforcement. 83 We turn now, then, to the new administration’s efforts once in office to counter these
moves.
III. Creating the new government: Appointments
The thickness of the political layer at the top of the national government 84 keeps the task of
peopling the new administration central alive well past the President’s inauguration. Creating a
responsive, functioning government requires a new President to nominate any officials requiring
Senate confirmation quickly, naming acting officials who can be trusted to advance the new administration’s agenda while waiting for nominees to be confirmed. It requires, as well, seeing to
the rapid appointment of those subordinate officials (“inferior officers”) Congress has provided
may be politically appointed without Senate involvement. While many government employees
working without civil service tenure protection—the economists of the Office of Management and
Budget and government attorneys, for example—are apolitical appointees who expect to continue
in their positions when administrations change, thousands in higher ranking positions are appointed politically and expected to resign upon the inauguration of a President of the opposing
party. As the scholarship of Anne Joseph O’Connell has dramatically shown, 85 their replacement
takes a great deal of time. The Trump administration’s actions encouraging apolitical public servants to resign and its deviation from the longstanding norms of apoliticality characterizing some
positions not formally protected by the civil service laws—for example, its firing of a number of
Inspectors General whose decisions to investigate administration actions were taken as a sign of
disloyalty, replacing them with loyalists86—has substantially increased the number of positions to
be filled. Finding needed replacements, and appointing successors to Trump loyalists without in
doing so seeming to endorse the political nature of the appointments, will in itself be a challenge.
These appointment tasks are inevitably complicated by the need for vetting to assure competence and to avoid conflicts of interest or other potential embarrassments. Their completion may
be delayed to the extent Congress has placed their appointment in the hands of cabinet secretaries
or others yet to be confirmed, if those candidates will control the choices made. The Constitution
82
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permits assigning to agency heads the great bulk of appointments to political positions, and one
can find in this provision, as in the requirement for Senate confirmation of principal officers, an
understanding consistent with its “checks and balances” design. It suggests loyalty to the law,
overseen by both political branches, as the governing consideration, and not loyalty to a personal
presidency at risk of becoming autocratic. In recent practice, however, Presidents have asserted
control over all political appointments through the White House Presidential Personnel Office,
whether statutes have assigned them to the President or to the heads of departments,. The PPO is
a small (and thus resource-constrained) part of the Executive Office of the President, that during
the transition was headed by a 30-year old confidant who gave cabinet secretaries explicit orders
whom among their subordinates they were to purge for disloyalty – in itself a profound personal
loyalty test. 87 President Trump’s dominating concern for loyalty among government employees,
and his administration’s strenuous efforts to reduce the size of government (particularly encouraging/forcing the departure of employees whose contributions were unwelcome to them) have both
created many vacancies in those apolitical appointees who might have expected to continue in their
positions when administrations changed, and to some extent filled the vacancies when created with
political loyalists whose continuation in their offices is for that reason undesirable.
1. Filling Out the Government. The sheer number of political positions a new administration
must fill on assuming office presents a daunting challenge. According to the “Plumbook,” in 2020
there were over 3,700 political positions that the President can fill: 1,118 presidentially nominated
“PAS” positions (in addition to federal judgeships) requiring the Senate’s consent; another 354
presidentially-appointed positions that are not PAS; 724 Senior Executive Service positions not
held by career officials; and 1566 Schedule C positions, which are positions excepted from the
civil service “because of their confidential or policy-determining character.” 88
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Filling this deep layer of political appointees, many to positions requiring Senate confirmation,
leads to extensive vacancies and delays. Although Presidents often have identified nominees to
cabinet positions prior to their inauguration, and congressional hearings to consider their candidacy may even have begun, the situation is quite different for important subcabinet positions. “Of
some 591 key positions requiring Senate confirmation, by early September Obama had 310 confirmed while Bush, had 294[, and] … Trump [had] only 117.” 89 Moreover, these vacancies and
delays continue throughout a President’s term in office. Anne Joseph O’Connell found that top
jobs in cabinet departments and executive agencies were vacant or filled by acting officials 15%
to 25% of the time in the period 1977-2005. 90 She also found that confirmation delays and difficulties are growing worse over time. For President Reagan, 17.5% failed and on average it took
59.4 days for confirmation, whereas President Obama experienced a 28% failure rate, and 127.2
days for confirmation. 91 Under President Trump, the number of these vacancies grew noticeably,
perhaps reflecting in part distaste for the publicity and possibly conflicted loyalty that could result
from the confirmation process, and the greater likelihood of political costs to their dismissal if
called for. Having to obtain Senate approval may result in nominations of candidates whose views
are not fully in line with the President’s or to the making of promises in committee hearings that
can later impede simple political loyalty to the President. President Trump, more than any predecessor, relied on acting officials, “my actings,” and on sub-delegations of authority within agencies
to less prominent actors. 92
Presidents blame the Senate for confirmation delays, and a number of scholars have called for
limiting when Senate confirmation is required. Currently, confirmation is required for a range of
positions that do not rise to the level of principal officers for which presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation are constitutionally required.93 Yet limiting confirmation will only go so far.
O’Connell’s data reveal that a more significant contributor is the time it takes Presidents to make
nominations. 94 To the extent the PPO controls political appointments by whomever made, identi89
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fying and vetting candidates for office, including weighing political considerations, is a time-consuming process for it, whether or not confirmation is required.95 Presidents exerting control over
agency hiring to install individuals who share their policy priorities, some argue, creates greater
politicization in agencies where technological competence may be the dominant characteristic desirable.96 Here, reliance on political appointees selected for loyalty or political connections rather
than competence can undercut governmental performance. How much of a problem this is depends
on the nature of the position at issue—though studies suggest that programs managed by political
appointees perform less well on average, loyalty and closer political connections may matter more
than policy or management expertise for some positions.97
For our purposes here, the central point is that the large number of political appointments to
fill consumes a great deal of a new presidential administration’s attention and energy. Moreover,
failures to adequately vet candidates can lead to costly missteps, if tax problems and other issues
lead prominent candidates to withdraw. President Obama’s nominating process quickly went from
being a success story to seeming disarray for such reasons; his first year ended with his then having
“the lowest percentage of confirmed executive branch positions of the five most recent presidents” 98 When nominations and confirmations at the subcabinet or undersecretary and deputy level
are delayed, the resulting lack of leadership can impede the President’s ability to implement key
policy initiatives. Here again the Obama experience proves the point: “Despite the worst economic
crisis in decades, Treasury Secretary Geithner worked without a main deputy for almost four
months,” with Obama not even announcing until March “nominations for any of the nearly two
dozen Senate-confirmed positions underneath Geithner,” “and those nominations covered only
three positions.” 99
For President Trump, committed to slowing government and “drain[ing] the swamp,” leaving
positions unfilled and the agency less able to act had appeal.100 But personnel and appointments
have dominated the early days of the Biden administration and, as noted above,101 President Biden
has enjoyed greater success than his recent predecessors both in nominating and in securing confirmations. Nonetheless, the Senate’s 50-50 split underscores the implications of the confirmation
process for the President’s range of choice in making nominations. Losing the support of a single
95
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Democratic Senator can doom a nomination, and this dynamic resulted in the withdrawal of his
candidate to lead the Office of Management and Budget, the most important bureaucratic element
of the EOP. 102 More generally, “it has become more and more difficult to fill … political positions
because of interbranch fights over nominees and short tenures once appointees are in office.” 103
While 23 of President George W. Bush’s nominees won unanimous confirmation, as did 19 of
President Obama, none of President Trump’s nominees did.
Anticipating the possibility of lengthy delays before its appointees were in place, the Biden
administration devised strategies to ensure that these delays would not impede work on the administration’s agenda. It did not, as past incoming Presidents occasionally have, invite Senate-confirmed officials from the outgoing administration to remain in office pending until their successors’
confirmation. Instead, it quickly filled a number of first assistant positions requiring only presidential appointment with outside individuals, which then permitted naming these individuals to
acting roles as the heads of divisions and bureaus within agencies. During the transition period it
also drew on the knowledge of former Obama officials to identify senior career agency staff meeting the position requirements imposed by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, who could
be trusted to implement Biden’s policies104 and appointed as “acting” leaders on inauguration.105
It did not announce these names until President Biden had assumed office, apparently to ensure
the Trump administration could not take actions against them. 106 A roster of policy experts, often
former Obama officials having extensive knowledge of their agencies, have filled out other political slots. 107
2. The Personnel Fallout of the Trump Years. In addition to the usual headaches of staffing
the government with its own personnel, President Biden faces broader and deeper problems the
Trump administration created that will be harder to address. The first is identifying and firing
Trump loyalists embedded in positions whose incumbents, like the civil servants in parliamentary
democracies are, are expected to implement the policies of the current administration, whatever
they may be. Then, there is his undermining of longstanding staffing norms and, finally, the results
of his attacks on the career civil service during his four years in office.
Before leaving office President Trump made a number of last-minute appointments of individuals to serve terms on various boards and commissions. Some of these appointees were close
political allies—such as Kelly Anne Conway, a Trump advisor for almost all of his term, and Corey
102
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Lewandowski, his 2016 campaign manager. 108 And as noted above, the last year of the Trump
administration saw a large number of political appointees “burrow” into the career ranks. 109 Although such burrowing is nothing new, the Trump administration appears to have undertaken it on
a more extensive scale than other recent presidents. 110 Upon taking office, Biden officials moved
quickly to stop and reverse these appointments, including firing a few Trump appointments to term
positions that in the past had not immediately changed hands upon the inauguration of a new President. 111 President Trump had himself broken with past practice in this way, removing officials
from positions generally viewed as apolitical during their terms in office. Most prominent was his
removal of FBI Director James Comey, who was only four years into a ten-year term. The position
of FBI Director is generally viewed as apolitical and Comey was only the second Director to be
fired in the FBI’s history. 112 He was overseeing an investigation into Trump’s advisers when fired,
and readers used to prosecutorial independence in parliamentary democracies should have little
difficulty understanding the implications of this action.
Many termed positions – also, for example, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue – do not
enjoy statutory for cause removal protection and instead, as with the FBI Director or Inspectors
General, longstanding norms against politicizing the positions operated to constrain removal. Even
where “for cause” protections have been enacted, they are shadowed by recent Supreme Court
decisions striking down restrictions on the President’s removal power—a position strongly advocated by the Trump administration recently. 113 Indeed, its disapproval of statutory removal protections for the Director of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau permitted President Biden immediately to remove the holdover CFPB Director and install an acting Director of his own choosing; at this writing, no nomination for the position has yet been made. 114 Removing former political officials who have transferred to career positions is more difficult, however.115
Far more problematic than dealing with holdover or burrowed Trump appointees is the corrosive effect that the Trump administration had on the government workforce generally during its
four years in office. Some of this harm came from violations of longstanding personnel norms and
protections. Executive orders overturned established practices with respect to union bargaining
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and representation, and made disciplining federal employees easier. government officials with policymaking responsibilities. 116 Agency political leadership sidelined or undertook retaliatory actions against career personnel viewed as resistant to the administration’s priorities or who had
supported Obama initiatives. 117 Meanwhile the Merit Systems Protection Board, the government
agency charged with adjudicating claimed violations of civil service rules and protections, has
lacked a quorum for the entirety of the Trump administration, and currently has a backlog of over
3,000 cases. 118 The lack of a functioning MSPB was in part the result of Trump’s delay in nominating Board members. But in when late in his administration President Trump made the nominations needed to reconstitute the MSPB, a Democrat objector blocked their confirmation by withholding his consent to a process unanimity. 119
President Trump’s broader attack on career government employees, routinely castigated as an
unaccountable “deep state,” led to a significant loss of government morale, expertise and institutional capacity, especially in the State Department and national security agencies. 120 The administration’s approach to the Covid19 pandemic made apparent the ways in which government scientists were routinely undercut. When the Department of Agriculture moved most of its Economic
Research Service and its National Institute of Food and Agriculture to the Kansas City area, 1,000
miles away, with less than half the population of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, half the
staff of these research offices resigned. 121 Eighty-seven percent of the staff of the Department of
the Interior who were asked to move to Grand Junction, Colorado – twice as far away and with a
population little more than 1% of the D.C. area’s. 122 These and other moves caused a dramatic
loss in expertise, productivity, and morale, requiring repair.123
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Had President Trump been re-elected, an even more dramatic assault on the civil service was
under way. On the eve of the recent election, he issued an executive order creating a new schedule
of government employees, schedule F, 124 that would have removed from the competitive civil service any employee having policy-making or enforcement authority – not only, in this way, extending the SES further into the government bureaucracy but also suspending such civil service protections as SES employees enjoy. All those positions could then be filled outside the competitive,
meritocratic regimes required for civil service positions, and would be classified as serving at-will.
While Presidents have statutory authority to create elements of the Civil Service excepted from its
requirements of competitive appointment and/or protected tenure—for example, government lawyers—Schedule F would have converted expert elements of what had been the apolitical government bureaucracy into political positions controlled by the White House and subject to change
with a change of administration. Prior use of this presidential authority had already substantially
reduced the proportion of government employees subject to the civil service regime. Schedule F
would truly have transformed transitions, essentially ending permanent government service above
the level of clerks and chauffeurs. The timeline for implementing this late executive order, however, effectively delayed its implementation until after President Biden’s inauguration. 125 It is perhaps not surprising that one of his first acts was to cancel this order, preserving in the Civil Service,
with its constraints on appointment and its assurances of job security and apolitical discipline, the
positions that might have been politicized by the schedule. 126
President Biden has also sought to emphasize the importance of the career workforce and to
counter the anti-bureaucracy rhetoric of the Trump years. 127 But in other contexts, figuring out
how to respond to Trump’s actions is more complicated. For example, removing improperly installed, Trump-affiliated IGs could be seen as reaffirming the neutrality of IGs, but could also
represent further erosion of the norm of IGs enjoying for-cause removal protection.128 Even if new
members to the MSPB are confirmed, addressing the Board’s extensive backlog will take time.
The loss of expertise and institutional capacity as a result of departures of senior career officials
may be particularly hard to remedy. It comes on top of longstanding concerns about an aging civil
service and congressional as well as presidential actions that have hurt federal employees.129 Reinvigorating the federal workforce will thus need to be a priority throughout Biden’s time in office.
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Finally, there are some Trump adaptations that Biden may opt to retain. One of these is
Trump’s extraordinary reliance on acting officials. Other Presidents have often relied on acting
officials, particularly when having to provide leadership pending confirmations at the beginning
of their terms. Yet, as Professor O’Connell has described, Trump’s sustained use of actings
throughout his administration distinguished his presidency. 130 President Biden’s extensive use of
actings so far, early in his term, falls within the traditional pattern. Yet, given the difficulties he
may face in getting nominees through a closely-divided Senate, it is possible that he will be content
to rely on them for a while. 131
IV. Undoing/Changing the Prior Administration’s Acts
Wholly apart from the challenges of transition, as such, America’s presidential system, compounded at present by the very narrow (and likely temporary 132) margins of President Biden’s
party’s command of the Congress, creates political conditions capable of fostering a significant
imbalance between the executive and the legislature. Here again, the comparisons with what might
be expected in a parliamentary system are striking. A parliamentary government’s political actors,
legislative and executive, are generally unified, having control of both primary and secondary legislation permitting agile change on transition. Ours are not, and the tendency to confuse the whole
of the executive branch with the presidency – the millions serving in administrative bodies and not
just the thousands on the White House staff – combined with Congress’s increasing difficulties in
dealing with important issues, 133 has effectively converted the President into the principal apparent
source of political action.
This is a development not lacking in challenges to democracy, as the Trump administration
demonstrated in strengthening further a decades-long trend that has effectively transferred government decision-making from the agencies Congress has authorized to make decisions, using transparent public procedures for the most important of these choices, to the opaque and highly political
processes of the White House. Bear in mind that the important political officials of agencies take
office only with Senatorial approval, and act subject to continuous congressional oversight (and,
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often, rather detailed budgetary control through the appropriations process). Congress exercises
far less control of the Executive Office of the Presidency. “Executive privilege” protects its advising functions from oversight, and budgetary controls are limited. And with few exceptions, a
President can fill the EOP as he or she wishes, with no need for Senate engagement.
To be sure, the effect is to facilitate transition and a new administration’s repair of its predecessor’s acts that it finds objectionable. Where Trump administration resistance to the teachings
of science had contributed to urgent national needs, the pandemic and climate change, the Biden
administration quickly expanded its policy staff. In his first days in office, President Biden issued
executive orders addressing COVID-19 and creating a number of White House positions, including COVID-19 Response Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator, COVID-19 Health Equity Task
Force Chair, and Senior White House pandemic adviser, and filling these positions with prominent
former government officials. 134 To the same ends, Biden created a White House office on climate
change headed by Obama EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy and staffed with multiple Obama
administration veterans and climate experts; and he named former Secretary of State John Kerry
as international climate envoy, heading up a team of his own. 135 Yet note how this extensive policy
presence connected to the White House can compromise the duties Congress has assigned to the
agencies it is more capable of controlling. It echoes the Obama administration’s use of White
House policy “czars” and suggests that Biden will seek to direct policy in these key areas. 136 And
Trump had his fair share of such advisors as well, with Stephen Miller, a senior advisor who exerted extensive control over the Trump administration’s immigration policy, the most prominent
example. 137 At a minimum, the fact that White House personnel do not require Senate confirmation means that they are able to get to work immediately on Biden’s policy agenda. And the longer
it takes to confirm agency heads, the more policy initiatives will emanate from the White House.
The world-wide trend toward autocracy is animated by such concentrations of authority in the
executive.138
The executive branch has a number of techniques for creating policy change. Executive orders,
memoranda and directives, instructions to responsible agencies and not to the public, can produce
the creation of programs or influence agency priorities. President Trump used executive orders
and OMB memoranda repeatedly to structure agency-White House interactions in ways that would
constrain policy change or, as with Schedule F, 139 heighten the presidency’s control over government bureaucrats. Presidents since Clinton have used directives, sometimes confused by the press
with actual achievement of the desired action, to instruct agency heads to take described actions. 140
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After some Republican legislators effectively blocked enactment of bipartisan immigration reform
legislation, for example, President Obama instructed the Department of Homeland Security to establish programs offering temporary relief from the threat of deportation and work permits to certain illegal immigrants who had long been in the country and law-abiding. 141
If statutorily authorized, as most are, government agencies using public procedures can adopt
regulations (secondary legislation) that if valid have the same force as statutes. But the need for
public engagement and prospect of intensive judicial review can slow that process considerably,
and recent Supreme Court opinions have suggested some possibility that, after more than two centuries of judicial tolerance for statutorily authorized rulemaking, a conservative Supreme Court
will sharply narrow if not wholly eliminate the circumstances in which rulemaking can constitutionally be authorized. Less formal are agency measures that do not directlyimpose requirements
on the public, but nonetheless encourage desired behavioral changes – the use of public databases
revealing information that can create public pressure for change, or the deployment of “soft law”
guidance announcing agency instructions to staff, interpretations, or plans that serve to create desired expectations; or create new programs to meet a perceived public need. Here, too, litigation
can frustrate these measures – an outcome that is not wholly unlikely with a politicized judiciary
disposed either favorably or unfavorably to the executive acting.
Our focus in these pages is not on these general characteristics of the American order, but on
the new administration’s ability to respond to its predecessor’s embeddings. Executive orders and
the like are perhaps the easiest targets, because they are wholly internal documents, lacking external legal force, and readily available in the White House’s electronic archives. One well-established transition-team task is identifying them and identifying those, like Schedule F, that should
promptly be withdrawn. This typically happens at an administration’s outset, on inauguration day
or soon after. January 20, 2021 saw many revocations, and prompt withdrawals continued at least
through January 22, when Schedule F was revoked. 142 A later executive order, issued February
24, revoked a number of others that may have prompted closer study, with dates ranging from
February 3, 2017, very soon after President Trump took office, to January 18, 2021, two days
before he left it. 143
Earlier discussion 144 introduced the phenomenon of “midnight rules,” common in all transitions, although the Trump administration’s adoption of 1490 of them fitting that description, with
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many of them quite important and sometimes made immediately effective 145 presented a major
challenge for the Biden administration. Some of the very latest of these Trump administration
regulations were immediately cast aside by the Biden administration. An Inauguration Day Memorandum from the Chief of Staff, long characteristic of transitions, instructed agencies to withdraw
from publication or postpone the effective date of any Trump midnight rules that had not yet become effective, until the new agency leadership could review them. 146 Its success is not entirely
assured, however; President Trump’s administration’s efforts summarily to rid itself of Obama
rules by a wider range of actions, often undertaken without lawyerly care, met considerable judicial
disapproval.147
A statutory remedy was available for the remainder of Trump’s midnight rules well into May,
2021, although its use was been sharply constrained by other needs for legislative action and by
the narrowness of the Biden administration’s congressional majorities. During the Clinton administration, Congress had enacted and the President signed the Congressional Review Act [CRA]. 148
This Act established an uncomplicated summary procedure for congressional adoption of a simple
resolution of disapproval within a limited period of time after receiving required notice of a regulation’s adoption, without having to follow the usual legislative processes of committee hearings,
reports, and attendant public scrutiny, and protected from procedural obstacles (such as the Senate
filibuster) by which a minority of legislators might be able to block its adoption. This process is
of little use during the administration of a President whose agencies are responsible for challenged
regulations; he can veto the bill disapproving his agency’s work, and a successful vote to override
that veto is unlikely. Contemplating the “midnight rules” phenomenon, however the CRA extends
the time period for this review into the new administration, permitting Congress to disapprove
rules adopted late in a President’s last year in office during the first weeks of the next presidential
term. Thus, when a national election both changes the political control of the White House, and
also returns a Congress that the new President’s party controls, they may be able summarily to rid
themselves of the most objectionable “midnight rules.”
Using the CRA, however, requires efforts that consume congressional resources at a time when
the new President needs them for other purposes – for example, securing Senate consideration of
and (hopefully) consent to his most important appointments The new President’s ability to invoke
this remedy is also a function of the extent to which his party controls the Congress. The process
of looking back at the prior administration’s work, that is, imposes costs on the possibility of present and future achievements. Only one such disapproval occurred after the Clinton-Bush transition and none after Bush-Obama. While the Trump administration succeeded in invoking the CRA
to disapprove Obama midnight rules fourteen times, a remarkable upswing, that affected less than
a third of the 50 economically significant rules the Obama administration had adopted during its
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last four months in office, that were open to CRA overturning. By early May, facing the 223 important Trump-administration rules in the CRA’s time window, President Biden and the Congress
his party so narrowly controls had used the Act only once to disapprove a Trump regulation; reportedly, it was planning only one more such effort.149
Other possibilities for removing Trump embeddings remain available. If challenged in stillpending litigation, a potentially effective option for the Biden administration is changing the government’s position from defense of the action to acquiescence, 150 or settling the dispute on terms
embodying its views – although such “friendly” use of judicial processes is open to criticism. New
rulemakings can be undertaken, but at significant costs in agency time and resources; and they
would themselves be open to judicial challenge. Lower profile embeddings might be easier to
correct, but difficult to find.151 Thus, the Trump administration will have proved successful in
embedding many of its policy preferences in an administration that would prefer to take a different
direction.
Readers wishing a more extensive account of the CRA, and of other low-profile tools for accomplishing regulatory roll-back that President Trump had used in his aggressive efforts to defeat
Obama initiatives, would do well to consult an extensive, remarkable essay published by Ricky
Revesz, the former Dean of NYU’s law school, and Bethany Noll that address both of these tools
and the ways in which numerous developments in American politics conspire to increase the uncertainty attending any administrations adopting of regulatory change.152 “Regulation in Transition,” they aptly remark, is the first article to identify and analyze tools for aggressive regulatory
rollbacks “largely overlooked, not just by the public, but also by legal scholars.” Their impact,
they argue, “will lead to a new conception of the president's regulatory power, in which two terms,
rather than just one, are necessary to promulgate significant and lasting regulatory policy.” 153
Conclusion
The transition from Trump to Biden, then, is both troubled and troubling. As work on this essay
was concluding, Republican senators used the filibuster to block creation of a bipartisan commission to investigate and report on the January 6 assault on Congress by legislation Republican negotiators had accepted as balanced – and in the national transition of such inquiries in response to
major national events. The legislative situation, given both the narrowness of Democrat control
and the stated priorities of Republican leadership to put all their efforts into blocking the new
administration’s success – using party discipline to preclude bipartisanship – will not just stymie
legislation. The tools of executive power are now in President Biden’s hands, and these roadblocks
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may tempt him further down the paths his predecessors have taken, asserting increasing control
over executive government’s functioning, acting on his own where cooperation cannot be had. To
repair the political damage President Trump inflicted on the government bureaucracy may prove
impossible without President Biden appearing himself still further to thicken the political layers
atop the civil service. Admiring his motivations, and troubled by the administration he succeeded,
the difficulty is seeing a clear path back to a government constrained by the norms that had long
kept our democracy safe.
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